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Abstract
We show that Trevisan’s extractor and its variants [Tre01, RRV99] are secure against bounded
quantum storage adversaries. One instantiation gives the first such extractor to achieve an output
length Θ(K − b), where K is the source’s entropy and b the adversary’s storage, together with
a poly-logarithmic seed length. Another instantiation achieves a logarithmic key length, with a
slightly smaller output length Θ((K − b)/Kγ) for any γ > 0. In contrast, the previous best con-
struction [Ts09] could only extract (K/b)1/15 bits. Some of our constructions have the additional
advantage that every bit of the output is a function of only a polylogarithmic number of bits from
the source, which is crucial for some cryptographic applications.
Our argument is based on bounds for a generalization of quantum random access codes, which
we call quantum functional access codes. This is crucial as it lets us avoid the local list-decoding
algorithm central to the approach in [Ts09], which was the source of the multiplicative overhead.
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1 Introduction
Randomness extractors are fundamental building blocks in pseudorandomness theory, with many
applications to derandomization, error-correcting codes, and expanders, among others. They are also
of central importance in cryptography, where they are often used to build key generation primitives.
In this context, one usually has the notion of an adversary, a malicious observer who is trying to
discover a bit of the honest player’s output. A prominent model for adversaries is the bounded
storage model, introduced by Maurer [Mau92], in which the adversary is allowed to store a limited
amount of information about the extractor’s input.
Formally, we say that a function Ext : {0, 1}N × {0, 1}t → {0, 1}m is a (K, ε) strong extractor if for
every distribution X with min-entropy at least K (X is called the source) and uniformly random Y
(called the seed), the distribution (Y,Ext(X,Y )) is within a statistical distance of at most ε from
the uniform distribution. The extractor is said to be secure against b bits of storage if Ext(X,Y ) is
ε-close to uniform even from the point of view of an adversary who has been allowed to store b bits
of information about X, and has also later been revealed the seed Y .
Constructions of extractors are known that are almost-optimal in all parameters, even in the presence
of the adversary (in fact, a result by Lu [Lu04] shows that any (K, ε) strong extractor is essentially a
(K + b, ε) extractor secure against b bits of storage). Nevertheless, in a world in which no adversary
can be trusted, Ko¨nig et al. [KMR05] introduced the following interesting twist: what if the adversary
is allowed quantum memory? In this setting, the fundamental difficulty that arises is a familiar one,
with a long history: how much information can be encoded in a quantum state?
The fact that this question can admit very different answers depending on its precise formulation is
reflected in the fact that some, but not all, classical extractor constructions are secure in the presence
of a quantum adversary, as was demonstrated in [GKK+07]. While many constructions have been
shown to be sound on a case-by-case basis [KMR05, KT08, FS08, Ts09], all have parameters that
are far from optimal either in terms of seed length or of output length.
Central to the proof of our result are bounds on a construct which we call quantum functional access
codes (QFAC), and we introduce them next.
Quantum functional access codes. Holevo [Hol73] was the first to tackle the question of the
information capacity of a quantum state, showing that one needs at least n qubits in order to encode
n bits of information. However, this bound only holds when it is required that the whole n bits be
recoverable from the quantum storage. As such, it is generally not applicable in a cryptographic
context, where typically even partial information is important. Instead of asking for the whole input
x ∈ {0, 1}n to be recoverable from its encoding Ψ(x), Ambainis et al. [ANTsV02] consider encodings
in which it is only required that any bit of x can be recovered from Ψ(x) with probability 1/2+ε (over
the measurement’s randomness), and they call such encodings ‘random access codes’ (RACs). Note
that, since the encoding is quantum, the recoverability of any one bit does not imply the recoverability
of the whole string x, so that Holevo’s bound does not apply. Nevertheless, Ambainis et al. showed
that RACs require essentially (1 − H(1/2 + ε))n qubits to encode n bits, where H is the binary
entropy function, providing a linear lower bound for fixed ε. These bounds have proved instrumental
in many results in information theory. In fact, as pointed out in [Ts09], random access codes provide
a way to construct one-bit extractors that are secure against quantum storage.
We push this question even further: what if, instead of asking that the encoding lets us recover any
bit of the input, we asked that it lets us recover any one out of some fixed set of functions of the
input? For example, we could ask about encodings that let us recover the XOR of any k bits of the
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input1, but one can also consider more general settings.
One might ask about the relevance of such encodings, when we already know that there are strong
linear lower bounds on RACs — surely, these will extend to any encoding which lets us recover more
than any single bit of the input. The key point here is that, even though both Holevo’s bound and
the RAC lower bounds are linear in the input length when the success probability p is fixed, the
two bounds scale very differently when one considers the dependence on p: while an improvement
on Holevo’s lower bound, due to Nayak and Salzman [NS06], scales as n − log 1/p, the RAC bound
scales as (4ε2/ ln 2)n for small ε = 2p−1. So we are asking, how does the minimal length of the code
scale with the success probability, depending on the set of functions that we are trying to recover?
Define a (n, b, ε) QFAC for a set of n-bit strings A and a set of functions C from A to {0, 1} as a
b-qubit encoding of strings x ∈ A such that, for any function f ∈ C, one can recover f(x) from the
encoding of x with success probability 1/2 + ε.2 Intuitively, the more the set of functions C is error
resilient (i.e., the more spread-out the images (f(x))f∈C ∈ {0, 1}|C|), the stronger the lower bound
should be on the length of the encoding. For example, using a simple reduction to known results we
can show that any (n, b, ε) QFAC for the set C = {fy : x 7→ x · y mod 2, y ∈ {0, 1}n} must have
length b ≥ n − log 1/ε. If one simply used the fact that any bit of x can be recovered from such a
QFAC with probability 1/2 + ε, the resulting bound would be the much weaker O(ε2n).
We believe that QFACs constitute a primitive that should be of wide interest in studying the prop-
erties of quantum states from an information-theoretic point of view. In this paper, we demonstrate
the relevance of this construct by showing how good bounds on some QFACs can be used to prove the
security of an extractor against quantum storage with almost-optimal parameters. In fact, many pre-
vious constructions of extractors against quantum storage can be seen as implicitly proving bounds
on QFACs. For example, the construction in [KMR05] shows that any (n, b, ε) QFAC for a set of
2-universal hashing functions must have length b ≥ n− 2 log 1/2ε.
Techniques. In this section we give an overview of our proof technique, explaining the connection
between extractors and QFACs in the context of Trevisan’s general construction paradigm [Tre01].
To describe this, let us first give a brief overview of the main steps that go into the proof of the
construction by Ta-Shma [Ts09].
The construction starts by encoding the weakly random source x ∼ X using a locally list-decodable
code C [STV01]. This is followed by an application of the Nisan-Wigderson generator [NW94],
interpreting C(x) as the truth table of the “hard” function.
The proof of correctness for this construction, as the first part of ours, follows the general recon-
struction framework of [Tre01]. For the sake of contradiction, assume that there is a test T , which
performs a measurement on the adversary’s quantum encoding Ψ(x) in order to distinguish the out-
put from uniform with advantage ε. A Markov argument shows that for at least an ε/2 fraction of
the samplings x from the source (call them bad samplings), T can distinguish the output (when the
source is x) from uniform with success at least ε/2. Consider any such bad sampling x. A standard
hybrid argument, along with properties of the Nisan-Wigderson generator, allows us to construct
a circuit T ′ (using little non-uniformity about x) which predicts a random position of C(x) with
probability 12 +
ε
m . Further, T
′ makes exactly one query to T .
At this stage, we have constructed a small circuit T ′, which uses the adversary’s quantum information
in order to predict the bits of C(x) with some small success probability. The proof in [Ts09] shows
1Such codes were introduced in [BARdW08], where they are called XOR-QRACs
2A RAC is then simply a QFAC for the set of coordinate functions fi : x 7→ xi.
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how from such a circuit, one can construct another circuit which predicts any position of x with
probability 0.99 and queries T ′ at most q = (m/ε)c times (c = 15 for the code in [Ts09]). This gives
a random access code for x; however since it makes q measurements on the quantum state Ψ(x), the
no-cloning theorem forces us to see it as having a length of q · b qubits. The main drawback of this
method is that the quantum state needs to be copied a large number of times in order to get a RAC
– thus yielding a weaker bound on the output length than one might hope for.
Our proof departs fundamentally from the usual reconstruction paradigm at this point: instead of
using a short RAC for C(x) to construct a longer RAC for x, we give a direct analytical argument
showing that any RAC for C(x) must be long. Note that a RAC for C(x) is simply a QFAC for the
class of functions fi : x 7→ C(x)i. Intuitively, such a QFAC cannot be short, even though its success
probability 1/2 + ε/m is small. If the QFAC is classical (CFAC), this is easy to show: assume that
there existed a short CFAC for this problem. One can just repeat the recovery procedure to get a
string y that agrees with C(x) at a fraction 1/2 + ε/m of positions, and then one can use the good
list-decoding properties of C to argue that the CFAC essentially lets us recover the whole input x,
and hence must be long. In the quantum setting, however, it is far from obvious if this is true, the
primary difficulty being that we cannot repeat the recovery procedure, since it involves measuring a
quantum state.
In order to overcome this difficulty, we directly prove a lower bound on the length of the QFAC derived
from the code. This lets us derive a contradiction, proving that our extractor is safe against quantum
storage. The idea for the lower bound consists in seeing any good QFAC as an adversary which uses
small memory, and is able to predict codeword positions. Using the fact that list decodable codes can
be interpreted as one-bit strong extractors, we can then use a a result by Koenig and Terhal [KT08]
to show that such an adversary would imply a classical adversary with similar storage against a
one-bit strong extractor, which we know does not exist. This leads to a contradiction, thus proving
the lower bound.
Our results We show that any extractor based on Trevisan’s construction paradigm and its vari-
ants [Tre01, RRV99] is also safe against a bounded quantum storage adversary, with almost the
same parameters as the classical construction. Rather than give the full technical result here (see
Theorem 4.5), we discuss instantiations with two specific codes.
We first use a code from [GHSZ02], which is obtained through the concatenation of the Reed-Solomon
code and the Hadamard code. This lets us prove the following:
Theorem 1.1 For any constants γ, c, c′ > 0, there is a polynomial-time computable function Ext :
{0, 1}N × {0, 1}t → {0, 1}m, where t = O(logN) and m = Ω (K−bKγ ), which is a (K,N−c) extractor
against b qubits of quantum storage, for any K ≥ N c′.
We note that the construction in [Ts09] uses the concatenation of a Reed-Muller code with the
Hadamard code, the parameters of the Reed-Muller code being chosen so that one can do local list-
decoding. In contrast, our analysis just needs a good list-decoding radius, but no local list-decoding
property. Hence our result carries over to [Ts09] and in particular implies that the construction
in [Ts09] has much better output length than the one shown in that paper, which was Ω((K/b)1/15).
This first construction does not have the desirable property of local computability. By using a different
code, we can also show the following:
Theorem 1.2 For any constants α, c > 0, there is a function Ext : {0, 1}N × {0, 1}t → {0, 1}m,
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where t = O(log4N) and m = Ω(αN−b), which is a (αN,N−c) extractor against b qubits of quantum
storage. Moreover, each bit output by the extractor is computable in poly logN time.
Even though it has a slightly larger seed length (note however that its output length is the optimal
Θ(αN − b)), a major advantage of this extractor is its simplicity: each bit of the output is simply the
XOR of O(logN) bits of the source, chosen based on the seed. In particular, it is locally computable3.
On the other hand, that construction is restricted to extracting from linear entropy rates. This is
inevitable, as lower bounds by Viola [Vio04] show that locally computable extractors cannot extract
from sources with entropy less than N0.99 using a polylogarithmic seed length.
The QFACs at the heart of this second construction are in fact the XOR-QRACs from [BARdW08].
A by-product of our proof is an improvement of the lower bound proved in that paper on the length
of such codes (see Corollary 3.10).
A nice side feature of both these constructions, especially if one is interested in cryptographic appli-
cations, is that it is possible to achieve an arbitrary inverse polynomial statistical distance from the
uniform distribution, while paying only a polylogarithmic cost in terms of output length and seed
length (this will be apparent from the more detailed statement of Theorem 1.1 given in Section 4).
This property was not known to hold for previous short seed extractor constructions against quantum
storage.
Applications to cryptography. Our results are of direct applicability to the following key ex-
pansion scenario. Alice and Bob share a small secret uniformly random key k. They would like to
expand it into a longer key k′ in order to securely communicate in presence of an adversary Eve. A
public source of weak randomness R (assume that R has min-entropy at least K) is available to all
parties. When the string R is broadcast, Eve is allowed to compute an arbitrary function Ψ which
maps the input to a state on b qubits i.e., Ψ : {0, 1}|R| → C2b×2b and store the result. However,
once she stores Ψ(R), her access to R is cut off. The goal is to come up with an efficient function
Ext which can be used by Alice and Bob to compute the shared string k′ = Ext(R, k). The required
security condition is that k′ is close to being uniformly random to Eve, even given her knowledge of
Ψ(R). In fact, we would like k′ to remain random even if k is later revealed to Eve (after Ψ(R) is
computed and access to R has been cut off).
For this application, it is important that Ext be locally computable, i.e. individual bits of the output
should be a function of a polylogarithmic number of bits of the source R. Indeed, since we are
putting a cap on the adversary’s storage it would be unreasonable not to put a similar cap on the
memory used by the honest parties Alice and Bob to compute bits of their shared key.
Our second construction has the property of being locally computable: every bit of the output is a
function of polylogarithmically many bits from the source. While various constructions of classical
locally computable extractors are already known [DM04, Lu04, Vad04, DT09], ours are the first to
be proved secure against quantum adversaries. This makes them particularly suitable for use in the
context of bounded storage cryptography.
We note here that the results in this paper have recently been extended by Portmann, Renner,
and the authors to show that Trevisan’s extractor is secure in a broader context than that of the
bounded-storage model [DPRV09]: they show security when one has a lower bound on the conditional
min-entropy of the source, conditioned on the adversary’s quantum information. This is a more
3For this to hold, we also need to check that the bits to be XOR-ed can be chosen in poly-logarithmic time, which
is the case in this construction.
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general assumption since it is implied by the bounded storage assumption, but the converse is not
true in general. Proving security in this setting is crucial in a cryptographic context, as it allows
secure composability of the extractor with other cryptographic primitives.
Organization of the paper. We start with some preliminaries in Section 2. In Section 3 we
introduce quantum functional access codes and give bounds for some specific families of these codes.
In Section 4 we describe our construction and state its parameters. Finally, the proof of security is
given in Section 5.
2 Notation and Preliminaries
The following notations are used throughout the paper. For x ∈ {0, 1}n, xi denotes the ith bit of
x. Given two n-bit strings x, y, we let ∆(x, y) denote their relative Hamming distance, i.e. the
fraction of positions at which they differ. Db denotes the set of all density matrices on b qubits
(complex 2b-dimensional positive matrices with trace 1). In general, a measurement M is described
by a list of positive operators Ma such that
∑
aM
†
aMa = Id. The probability that outcome a is
observed when the measurement is performed on a density matrix ρ is then given by Tr(MaρM
†
a).
All logarithms are taken in base 2. Throughout, H will denote the binary entropy function H(x) =
−x log x− (1− x) log(1− x) for 0 < x < 1. We set the convention that H(0) = H(1) = 0.
Distributions. The uniform distribution on {0, 1}n is denoted by Un. We will manipulate random
variables that have both classical and quantum parts. In general, given two classical random variables
X, Y , X◦Y is the same as the random variable (X,Y ). Given two states ρ, σ, ρ◦σ is just ρ⊗σ. Finally,
given a classical random variable X : Ω→ {0, 1}n and a quantum random variable ρ : Ω→ Db, X ◦ρ
denotes the state Ew∈Ω [|X(w)〉〈X(w)| ⊗ ρ(w)]. The statistical distance between two distributionsD1
andD2 (or, more generally, the trace distance when these distributions involve quantum components)
is denoted by ‖D1 −D2‖.
Definition 2.1 A (classical) distribution X is said to have min-entropy at least K (denoted H∞(X) ≥
K) if ∀x, Pr[X = x] ≤ 2−K .
Extractors. We first give the the formal definition of a strong extractor.
Definition 2.2 Ext : {0, 1}N × {0, 1}t → {0, 1}m is said to be a (K, ε) strong extractor if for every
distribution X with min-entropy at least K, we have that ‖Um+t − Ext(X,Ut) ◦ Ut‖ ≤ ε. Here both
Ut’s in the second expression correspond to the same sampling.
X is usually called the source (and N its length), while the extractor’s second input is called the seed
(of length t).
We now extend this definition to that of a strong extractor secure against a bounded-storage quantum
adversary.
Definition 2.3 Ext : {0, 1}N × {0, 1}t → {0, 1}m is said to be a (K, ε) strong extractor against b
qubits of quantum storage if for every map Ψ : {0, 1}N → Db and every distribution X such that
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H∞(X) ≥ K
‖Um ◦Ψ(X) ◦ Ut − Ext(X,Ut) ◦Ψ(X) ◦ Ut‖ ≤ ε (1)
where both Ut’s in the second expression correspond to the same sampling.
We note that condition (1) above is equivalent to requiring that for any collection of measurements
{M0u,y,M1u,y} on Db,∣∣∣Ex∼X,y∼Ut
[
Tr
(
Eu∈{0,1}m
[
M1u,yΨ(x)(M
1
u,y)
†
])
−Tr
(
M1Ext(x,y),yΨ(x)(M
1
Ext(x,y),y)
†
) ]∣∣∣ ≤ ε
Quantum codes. A (n, b) quantum encoding is a map Ψ : {0, 1}n → Db. A fundamental theorem
due to Holevo states that, for any fixed measurement M , the outcome of that measurement when
performed on Ψ(x) cannot contain more information about x than a classical string of b bits:
Theorem 2.4 [Hol73] Let X be any distribution on {0, 1}n and Ψ(X) = Ex∈X [Ψ(x)]. For a par-
ticular measurement M , let YM denote the classical random variable resulting from applying the
measurement on Ψ(X). If I(X : Y ) denotes the mutual information of X and Y and S(Ψ(X))
denotes the von Neumann entropy of Ψ(X), then I(X : Y ) ≤ S(Ψ(X)).
Oracle circuits. Our proofs of security will involve the construction of oracle circuits. If A is an
oracle circuit, we denote by AB the circuit that uses B as the oracle. Further, let C be an oracle
machine which uses A as an oracle (denoted by CA). Then it is understood that when C calls A, then
A calls the appropriate oracle B. Thus CA ≡ CAB . We will say that a circuit C : {0, 1}n+t → {0, 1}
computes a function f with t bits of advice if there is a string a ∈ {0, 1}t such that for every
x ∈ {0, 1}n, C(x, a) = f(x).
We will use the following easy claim:
Claim 2.5 Let B be any oracle such that oracle circuit A can be constructed using at most t1 bits
of advice and A queries B at most q1 times. Again let C be an oracle circuit which queries A and
C can be constructed using at most t2 bits of advice. Further, C queries A at most q2 times. Then
C can be considered as an oracle circuit which queries B at most q1q2 times and can be constructed
using at most t1 + t2 bits of advice.
3 Quantum Functional Access Codes
Consider the following problem from the theory of error-correcting codes. Let C : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m
be a code which is (ε, L) list-decodable i.e. for any x ∈ {0, 1}m, there are at most L codewords y
such that ∆(x, y) ≤ 12 − ε. Let A = {C(x) : x ∈ {0, 1}n} be the set of all codewords, and consider
Enc : A → {0, 1}b, a probabilistic encoding such that for every z ∈ A, zi can be recovered from
Enc(z) with probability 12 + 2ε, on average over the choice of i ∈ [m]. Given Enc(z), by performing
the recovery procedure for every index i, we obtain a string y which will agrees with z on at least a
1
2 + ε fraction of the positions with high probability. But then the exact element z can be recovered
using just an additional log |L| bits of advice (as per the list-decodability property of C). Hence, Enc
can be seen as a high-probability encoding of any codeword, using only b + log |L| bits. However,
the obvious information-theoretic bound shows that this must be at least log |C| bits, implying that
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b ≥ log |C||L| . This is much better than the bound b ≥ O(ε2 log |C|/ log n), for small ε, that one gets if
there is no guarantee on the structure of the set C (see Theorem 3.2 in [Ts09] for a proof).
To model this situation more precisely, note that the recovery procedure lets us recover any bit of C(x)
with non-trivial probability. As such, Enc can be seen as a probabilistic encoding of every x ∈ {0, 1}n
which lets us evaluate a class of functions C = {gi : x 7→ C(x)i, i ∈ [n]}. This is a generalization of
the usual random access codes, introduced in [ANTsV02], for which C = C1 = {gi : x 7→ xi, i ∈ [n]}.
It is natural to expect that lower bounds for this more demanding kind of random access code would
be tighter than more general lower bounds, in a way that depends on the structure of C. We introduce
the following definition:
Definition 3.1 Let A ⊂ {0, 1}n, and C ⊂ {f : A → {0, 1}} a set of functions defined on A. For
ε ∈ (0, 1/2], a (n, b, ε) quantum functional access code, or QFAC, for (A, C) is a map Ψ : A → Db
such that, for every f ∈ C, there is a measurement Mf = {M0f ,M1f } such that for every x ∈ A,
Tr(M
f(x)
f Ψ(x)(M
f(x)
f )
†) ≥ 1/2 + ε. If this first property only holds on average over the choice of f ,
then we’ll say that Ψ is a (n, b, ε) QFAC on average for (A, C).
The discussion above shows a strong lower bound on the length of any classical functional access
code for a set of functions C = {gi : x 7→ C(x)i, i ∈ [n]} that is derived from a good list-decodable
code C. However, the classical argument cannot be extended in a straightforward manner to the
quantum case, as it is dependent upon performing successive measurements on the encoding. If the
encoding is quantum, the first such measurement will destroy the state, and we will not be able to
proceed further.
Nevertheless, for some specific cases, such bounds follow from previously known results. We start
with the standard setting of random access codes, for which Theorem 4.1 in [ANTsV02] implies the
following (see also Theorem 3.2 in [Ts09]):
Lemma 3.2 Let A ⊆ {0, 1}n and ε ∈ (0, 1/2] such that there exists a (n, b, ε) quantum functional
access code for (A, C1). Then log |A| ≤ O
(
b logn
ε2
)
.4
Central to this work is the fact that functional access codes for larger classes of functions than the
simple coordinate functions C1 enjoy much stronger lower bounds, with a weaker dependence on the
success probability ε. Ko¨nig, Maurer and Renner [KMR05] show the following:
Theorem 3.3 ([KMR05], Thm. 12 and Cor. 13) Let C be the set of all functions from {0, 1}n
to {0, 1}. Then any (n, b, ε) QFAC on average for (A, C) satisfies log |A| ≤ b+2 log 1/2ε. Moreover,
the same bound holds if C is any family of two-universal hash functions, and the decoding procedure
is only required to be correct on average over the choice of x ∈ A.
There is an obvious connection between lower bounds on the length of QFACs and lower bounds on
one-way quantum communication complexity, even though results in the latter setting usually do not
focus on the error dependence as much as is needed for our applications. Nevertheless, the following
bound easily follows from known results:
4As noted in [Ts09], the loss of a factor log n is inevitable. Note however that this can be removed in the case where
A = {0, 1}n by following the proof for quantum random access codes in [ANTsV02].
7
Lemma 3.4 Let C = {gy : x 7→ x ·y mod 2, y ∈ {0, 1}n}. If there exists a (n, b, ε) QFAC for (A, C),
then log |A| ≤ b+ 2 log(1/2ε).
Proof: Note that any (n, b, ε) QFAC for (A, C) implies a one-way quantum protocol for the
communication problem in which Alice is given x ∈ A, Bob is given y ∈ {0, 1}n, and their goal
is to output x · y mod 2. Using a reduction from [CDNT98], any such protocol communicating b
qubits and succeeding with probability 1/2 + ε can be transformed into a protocol that sends any
x ∈ A to Bob, using b qubits, with success probability 4ε2. Theorem 1.1 in [NS06] then shows that
b ≥ log |A| − log(1/4ε2).
Families of two-universal hash functions over {0, 1}n, as well as the Hadamard code, both have size
Ω(2n), which makes them unsuitable for our purposes. Indeed, in our applications to extractors we
will use the seed to select a few random functions from the family C and apply them to the source
in order to obtain the output. However, using any of the last two function families would require a
seed of length linear in the source length, whereas we would like it to be poly-logarithmic.
Our main result relies on the fact, proved below, that there are no short QFACs for families of
functions that are defined from list-decodable codes. This extends the discussion introducing this
section to the case of quantum encodings, and in fact we will get essentially the same bound as stated
there — even though, as we argued was necessary, the proof will be very different. It will be useful
to consider approximately list-decodable codes, which we define as follows:
Definition 3.5 Let ε, δ > 0 and L ∈ N. A code C : {0, 1}N → {0, 1}N is (ε, δ, L) approximately
list-decodable if for every x ∈ {0, 1}N , there exists at most L strings {yi}Li=1 ∈ {0, 1}N , such that for
any string z ∈ {0, 1}N satisfying ∆(x,C(z)) < 1/2 − ε, ∃i ∈ {1, . . . , L} such that ∆(z, yi) ≤ δ. If C
is (ε, 0, L) approximately-list decodable then we simply say that C is (ε, L) list-decodable.
Proposition 3.6 Let ε, δ > 0 and L ∈ N. Let C : {0, 1}N → {0, 1}N be a (ε/2, δ, L) approximately
list-decodable code, and C = {fi : x 7→ C(x)i, i ∈ [N ]}. Let A ⊆ {0, 1}N , and suppose that there
exists a (N, b, ε) QFAC on average for (A, C). Then
log |A| < H(δ)N + b+ logL+O(log 1/ε)
Moreover, this bound holds even when we only require the QFAC to have success probability 1/2 + ε
on average over the choice of x ∈ A, instead of for all x.
The proof crucially relies on the result by Ko¨nig and Terhal [KT08] that strong one-bit extractors are
automatically safe against quantum adversaries, in some range of parameters. It proceeds through
the following three steps:
1. Show that any (ε, δ, L) approximately list-decodable code C defines a good 1-bit classical strong
extractor.
2. Use Theorem III.1 from [KT08] to show that the previous extractor is automatically safe against
quantum adversaries that are allowed a bounded amount of storage.
3. Conclude by showing how the security against quantum storage implies a lower bound on any
QFAC on average for (A, C).
We proceed with the details.
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Proof: Let t = logN (assume it an integer for simplicity) and consider the following 1-bit extractor
E : {0, 1}N × {0, 1}t → {0, 1}
(x, y) 7→ C(x)y
The following claim proves item 1 above.
Claim 3.7 E : {0, 1}N × {0, 1}t → {0, 1} as defined above is a (K, ε) strong extractor for any
K > H(δ)N + logL+ log 2ε .
Proof: Assume for the sake of contradiction that E is not a (K, ε) strong extractor. Then there
is a distribution D with min-entropy K, and a statistical test T such that the following holds.
| P
y∼Ut,x∼D
[T (y) = C(x)y]− 1
2
| ≥ ε
With a possible flip in the output of circuit T , we get a new test T ′ such that
P
y∼Ut,x∼D
[T ′(y) = C(x)y] ≥ 1
2
+ ε
By a Markov argument, there is a set BAD ⊆ {0, 1}N such that for every x ∈ BAD,
P
y∼Ut
[T ′(y) = C(x)y] ≥ 1
2
+
ε
2
and Px∼D[x ∈ BAD] ≥ ε/2. Evaluating T ′ on every possible y ∈ {0, 1}t results in a string x′ such
that
P
y∈{0,1}t
[x′y = C(x)y] ≥
1
2
+
ε
2
(2)
We can now use the (ε/2, δ, L) list-decodability properties of C. For any x′ satisfying (2) we can get
a set of k ≤ L strings x1, . . . , xk such that at least one of them satisfies that
P
y∼UN
[xiy = xy] ≥ 1− δ (3)
Note that process of finding x1, . . . , xk need not be polynomial time, but we only require existence
here; the important point is that the list of xi is uniquely determined by x′ (take the lexicographically
smallest list satisfying the conditions in the fact). If x1, . . . , xk are known, then we require at most
logL bits to specify i ∈ [t] such that xi satisfies (3). Once xi is specified, we know that x must be
among one of the at most 2H(δ)N possible N -bit strings which are δ-close to x. Hence we require
an additional H(δ)N bits to fully specify x. Thus, the total amount of bits used to specify x is
logL+H(δ)N , which in turn implies that the size of the set BAD is bounded by L · 2H(δ)N .
To conclude the argument, observe that every element in BAD is sampled with probability at most
2−K and hence PX∈D[X ∈ BAD] ≤ (L · 2−K+H(δ)N ). However, this is a contradiction if
L · 2−K+H(δ)N < ε
2
i.e. K > H(δ)N + logL+ log
2
ε
which gives the bound stated in the claim.
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Let η > 0 be an error parameter, A ⊆ {0, 1}N , and UA the uniform distribution on A. Theorem III.1
in [KT08] implies that, as long as
log |A| − b ≥ K + log 1/η, (4)
the function E is automatically a (log |A|, 3√η) extractor that is secure against b qubits of quantum
storage (see Definition 2.3). This means that, for any collection of quantum states Ψ(x) ∈ Db,
knowledge of y and Ψ(x) cannot help distinguish E(x, y) from a uniformly random bit with advantage
more than 3
√
η (over the choice of x in A, and uniform y). In particular, we have that for any
collection of measurements {M0y ,M1y }y∈{0,1}t on Db,
Ex∈A, y∈{0,1}t
[
Tr(M
C(x)y
y Ψ(x)(M
C(x)y
y )
†)
]
≤ 1/2 + 3√η/2
By definition, any (N, b, ε) QFAC on average for (A, C), even one that is only correct on average over
the choice of x, contradicts this conclusion for η = 4ε2/9. Hence our assumption (4) on the size of
A must be contradicted, i.e. any such QFAC must be such that log |A| < K + b+ log 9/4ε2. Setting
K to be the smallest possible value satisfying the condition in Claim 3.7, we get
log |A| < H(δ)N + b+ logL+O(log 1/ε)
We describe two instantiations of this proposition, for specific families of codes. The first one, which
will let us get an extractor with optimal seed length, is based on the following from [GHSZ02]:
Fact 3.8 For any N ∈ N, ε > 0, there exists a polynomial-time computable code CR : {0, 1}N →
{0, 1}N , where N = O(N/ε4), that is (ε,O(1/ε2)) list-decodable.
These codes lead to the following, the proof of which follows immediately from Proposition 3.6:
Corollary 3.9 Let CR be the code from Fact 3.8, and CR = {fi : x 7→ C(x)i, i ∈ [N ]}. Then any
(N, b, ε) QFAC on average for (A, CR) is such that
log |A| < b+O(log 1/ε)
Moreover, this bound holds even when we only require the QFAC to have success probability 1/2 + ε
on average over the choice of x ∈ A.
Our second main construction uses a QFAC for the class Ck = {g : x 7→
⊕k
j=1 xij , (i1, . . . , ik) ∈ [n]}.
QFACs for this class of functions were introduced in [BARdW08], where they are called XOR-QRACs.
That paper shows a bound on the length of such codes using a generalization of the hypercontractive
inequality to matrix-valued functions. We improve their result by showing the following:
Corollary 3.10 Let k,N be integers, and ε > 2k2/2N . Let A ⊂ {0, 1}N . If there exists a (N, b, ε)
QFAC on average for (A, Ck), then
log |A| < b+H
(
1
k
ln
2
ε
)
N +O
(
log
1
ε
)
Moreover, this bound holds even when we only require the QFAC to have success probability 1/2 + ε
on average over the choice of x ∈ A.
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By generalizing the proof of Theorem 7 in [BARdW08] (which is only stated for A = {0, 1}N in
that paper), we can get the bound log |A| ≤ b + (1− 12 ln 2 (2ε)2/k + oN (1))N for all k ≥ log logN .
This would lead to an extractor construction which only works for sources with min-entropy γN for
γ > 0.28, and our improvement on their bound gets rid of this constraint.
Proof: The following lemma (for a reference, see [IJK06], Lemma 42) shows that for any ε >
2k2/2N , the XOR code is (ε, (1/k) ln(2/ε), 4/ε2) approximately list-decodable.
Lemma 3.11 For every ε > 2k2/2N and z′ ∈ ({0, 1}N )k, there is a list of t ≤ 4/ε2 elements
x1, . . . , xt ∈ {0, 1}N such that the following holds: for every z ∈ {0, 1}N which satisfies
P
{y1,...,yk}∈(Nk )
[z′(y1,...,yk) = ⊕ki=1zyi ] ≥
1
2
+ ε
there is an i ∈ [t] such that
P
y∼UN
[xiy = zy] ≥ 1− δ
with δ = (1/k) ln(2/ε).
Note that in [IJK06] the lemma is proved for tuples instead of sets, and has a t ≤ 1/ε2. However, since
most tuples are sets, it is straightforward to get the above version for sets. Plugging the list-decoding
parameters from this lemma in the bound of Proposition 3.6 immediately gives the result.
4 Overview of the construction
Our construction follows the general paradigm introduced by Trevisan [Tre01] and its subsequent
adaptation against quantum storage by Ta-shma [Ts09]. However, our proof technique differs from
that of [Ts09] in that it avoids constructing random access codes by copying the adversary’s storage
many times. Rather, we use the much stronger bounds on QFACs proved in Section 3. This is
crucial in allowing us to prove an additive, rather than multiplicative, dependence of the output on
the adversary’s storage.
We first describe a few standard tools that are used in the construction, before giving it in detail.
Its correctness will be proved in Section 5.
4.1 Preliminaries
Definition 4.1 A collection of subsets S1, . . . , Sm ⊂ [t] is called a (t, n,m, ρ) weak design if for all
i, |Si| = n and for all j,
∑
i<j 2
|Si∩Sj | ≤ ρ(m− 1).
The following theorem is due to Raz, Reingold and Vadhan [RRV99].
Theorem 4.2 For every m, t ∈ N and ρ ≥ 2, there is a (t, n,m, ρ) design which is computable in
time (mt)O(1) with t = O( n
2
log ρ).
Note that the value of t blows up when ρ approaches 1. In order to keep t bounded even as
ρ approaches 1, we can use a construction given in [RRV99]. Even though the construction is
computable in polynomial time, it does not meet many finer notions of efficiency which are of interest
to us. Hartman and Raz [HR03] achieved similar parameters with a better efficiency:
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Theorem 4.3 For every m, t ∈ N such that m > nlogn and 0 < γ < 12 , there is a (t, n,m, 1 + γ)
design such that t = O(n2 log 1γ ). Further, each individual set in the design can be output in time
polynomial in t and n.
For the purposes of this paper, let t(n, ρ) denote the smallest value of t for which Theorems 4.2 or 4.3
guarantee the existence of a weak (t, n,m, ρ) design. Whether we use Theorem 4.2 or 4.3 depends
on how small we want ρ to be.
Our last tool is the Nisan-Wigderson generator with respect to a function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}.
Definition 4.4 Let S1, . . . , Sm be a (t, n,m, ρ) weak-design. Let x ∈ {0, 1}2n . Then NW x :
{0, 1}t → {0, 1}m is defined as
NW x(y) = xyS1 , . . . , xySm
Here xSj denotes the restriction of x to the indices in Sj .
4.2 Description of the construction
Let C : {0, 1}N → {0, 1}N be a code with good (possibly approximate) list-decoding capabilities,
and (S1, . . . , Sm) be a (t, logN,m, ρ) design as discussed above. Then the extractor is obtained by
combining these two constructs in the following way:
ExtC : {0, 1}N × {0, 1}t → {0, 1}m
(x, y) 7→ NWC(x)(y)
4.3 Main theorem
Our main result is the following:
Theorem 4.5 Let δ, ε > 0. Let C : {0, 1}N → {0, 1}N be a (ε/m, δ, L) approximately list-decodable
code, and t = t(logN, ρ) such that there exists a (t, logN,m, ρ) design for all large enough m. Then
for any K, b ∈ N the function ExtC : {0, 1}N ×{0, 1}t → {0, 1}m is a (K, 2ε) extractor secure against
b qubits of quantum storage, where
m =
K − b− t−H(δ)N − logL− Ω(log(1/ε) + logN)
1 + ρ
We give two instantiations of this result. The first one uses the codes from Fact 3.8, and lets us
achieve optimal seed length. We obtain it by setting ρ = Kγ/2, for any γ > 0, and using the
combinatorial designs guaranteed by Theorem 4.2:
Corollary 4.6 Let γ, c, c′ > 0 be any constants. Let CR be the code obtained from Fact 3.8 by
setting ε = N−c. Then the function ExtCR : {0, 1}N × {0, 1}t → {0, 1}m, where t = O(logN) and
m = Ω
(
K−b
Kγ
)
, is a (K, 2ε) extractor against b qubits of quantum storage for any K ≥ N c′.
An inconvenient aspect of this construction, particularly relevant to cryptography, is that, even
though the extractor is polynomial-time computable, it is not locally computable. Indeed, any bit
of the output may require polynomial time to be computed, whereas one might wish for it to be
computable in polylogarithmic time. We achieve such an extractor by taking C = Ck : {0, 1}N →
{0, 1}(Nk ) the XOR code Ck(x)y1,...,yk = xy1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ xyk . By using these codes together with the
designs from Theorem 4.3, the bound from Corollary 3.10 gives the following:
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Corollary 4.7 Let α, δ, c > 0 be any constants. Then there is a k = O(log(m/ε)/δ2) such that the
function ExtCk : {0, 1}N × {0, 1}t → {0, 1}m, where t = O(log4N) and m = 12((α − 2δ)N − b), is a
(αN,N−c) extractor against b qubits of quantum storage.
Note that this extractor is locally computable, and every individual bit of the output can be computed
in polylogarithmic time, as the designs in Theorem 4.3 are locally computable. Note also that the
extractor only works for linear entropy rates: as mentioned earlier, this is tight due to lower bounds
by Viola [Vio04] on the seed length required to extract from sources with polynomially small min-
entropy using low complexity circuits.
5 Proof of security
We give the proof of security of our construction. The first steps of the proof follow the general
reconstruction paradigm from [Tre01], and we give them first.
5.1 Proofs in the reconstruction paradigm
We start with the following standard observation.
Observation 5.1 In order to prove that Ext : {0, 1}N × {0, 1}t → {0, 1}m is a (K, 2ε) strong
extractor against b qubits of storage, it suffices to prove that for any collection of measurements
{M1u,y,M0u,y}(u,y)∈{0,1}m+t on Db, and Ψ : {0, 1}N → Db, there are at most ε2K strings x ∈ {0, 1}N
such that∣∣∣Ey∈{0,1}t
[
Tr
(
Eu∈{0,1}m
[
M1u,yΨ(x)(M
1
u,y)
†
] )
− Tr
(
M1Ext(x,y),yΨ(x)(M
1
Ext(x,y),y)
†
)]∣∣∣ > ε (5)
Proof: Assume for contradiction that Ext : {0, 1}N × {0, 1}t → {0, 1}m is not a (K, 2ε) strong
extractor against b qubits of quantum storage. By definition, there exist measurements
{M1u,y,M0u,y}(u,y)∈{0,1}m+t on b qubits such that∣∣∣Ex∼X,y∼Ut
[
Tr
(
Eu∈{0,1}m
[
M1u,yΨ(x)(M
1
u,y)
†
] )
−Tr
(
M1Ext(x,y),yΨ(x)(M
1
Ext(x,y),y)
†
)]∣∣∣ > 2ε
where X is the source’s distribution. Since it has min-entropy at least K, it must be true that for
at least ε2K inputs x,∣∣∣Ey∼Ut
[
Tr
(
Eu∈{0,1}m
[
M1u,yΨ(x)(M
1
u,y)
†
] )
−Tr
(
M1Ext(x,y),yΨ(x)(M
1
Ext(x,y),y)
†
)]∣∣∣ > ε
Fix a collection of measurements {M1u,y,M0u,y}u,y∈{0,1}m+t on Db. The previous observation shows
that, in order to show that Ext is a strong extractor, it suffices to bound the number of strings x
such that (5) holds. For this, we use the reconstruction approach in [Tre01]. For a fixed x, define
Mx : {0, 1}m+t → {0, 1} as the probabilistic procedure which, on input (u, y) ∈ {0, 1}m+t , outputs 1
with probability Tr(M1u,yΨ(x)(M
1
u,y)
†), where Ψ(x) is the state of the adversary’s storage on x. For
the most part our proofs will simply treat Mx as a probabilistic oracle. Moreover, all probabilities
that we write involving Mx, or other oracle circuits making calls to Mx, will implicitly be taken over
Mx’s internal randomness.
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The first step is to use the standard hybrid argument followed by Yao’s distinguisher versus predictor
lemma to get an oracle circuit T which queriesMx exactly once, and is such that T predicts Ext(x, y)i
with some advantage over a random guess when y as well as the value of x on some related points
are given as input. We skip the (by now, standard) argument and state the final result (see [Tre01]
for details).
Lemma 5.2 Let x, ε be such that (5) is satisfied, and Ext(x, y)i be the i
th bit of the extractor’s
output on (x, y). Then using m+logm+3 bits of classical advice, we can construct an oracle circuit
T which makes one query to Mx and is such that for some 1 ≤ i ≤ m, T satisfies:
Pry∈Ut [T
Mx(y,Ext(x, y)1, . . . , Ext(x, y)i−1) = Ext(x, y)i] ≥ 1
2
+
ε
m
(6)
Our next step is to construct a small circuit Rx which predicts the value of C(x) at any position y
with some non-negligible success probability, leading to the following technical lemma:
Lemma 5.3 Let x, ε be such that (5) is satisfied. Then using m(1 + ρ) + logm + t + O(1) bits of
classical advice, we can construct an oracle circuit Rx which makes one query to Mx and predicts
C(x)z with probability 1/2 + ε/m, on average over the choice of z ∈ {0, 1}N .
Proof: By Lemma 5.2, using m + logm + 3 bits of advice, we can get an oracle circuit T which
makes exactly one query to Mx and for some 1 ≤ i ≤ m satisfies
P
y
[TMx(y,C(x)yS1 , . . . , C(x)ySi−1 ) = C(x)ySi ] ≥
1
2
+
ε
m
Let us split y into two parts z = ySi and w = y[t]−Si. Let ySj be denoted by hj(z, w). The above
probability can then be rewritten as
P
z,w
[TMx(z, w,C(x)h1(z,w), . . . , C(x)hi−1(z,w)) = C(x)z] ≥
1
2
+
ε
m
By an averaging argument, we can fix a w (using at most t bits of advice) such that the above in-
equality holds with the probability taken over z. Let us hardwire all the possible values of C(x)hj(z,w)
(for the fixed value of w), as z varies over {0, 1}N and j varies between 1 and i− 1, into the circuit
T . By the definition of a weak design, there are at most (m − 1)ρ bits that need to be hardwired.
Let Rx be the circuit with all the hardwired values. Rx satisfies the following
P
z
[RMxx (z) = C(x)z] ≥
1
2
+
ε
m
(7)
The total classical advice taken so far is m+ logm+ t+mρ+O(1).
5.2 Security against quantum storage from lower bounds on QFACs
Assume for contradiction that there is an adversary to Ext, which can distinguish its output from
uniform given access to the seed y and some partial quantum information Ψ(x) ∈ Db about the source.
Such an adversary can be described by the mapping Ψ, together with a collection of measurements
{M1u,y,M0u,y}u,y∈{0,1}m+t on Db describing the adversary’s measurement on his quantum information
Ψ(x), when provided with the seed and the extractor’s output5.
5This describes the most general situation, as we can always assume that any measurement made by the adversary
is done at the end of his recovery procedure.
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For a fixed x, let Mx : {0, 1}m+t → {0, 1} as in Section 5.1. By Observation 5.1, to prove that Ext is
a (K, 2ε) strong extractor secure against b qubits of quantum storage, it suffices to prove that there
are at most ε2K strings x such that (5) holds.
The key conceptual step in our proof is to observe that from the circuit Rx given by Lemma 5.3, we
can construct a QFAC for the family C = {fi : x 7→ C(x)i, i ∈ [N ]} of codeword positions, and the
set A of all x satisfying (5). The strong lower bounds we proved in Section 3 then let us bound the
size of the set A as a function of the adversary’s storage and the list-decoding properties of C. The
following claim makes this connection formal.
Claim 5.4 Let η > 0 and A ⊆ {0, 1}N be such that, for any x ∈ A, using only c bits of classical
advice, we can construct a circuit Rx which has access to a b-qubit quantum state and is such that
for a random y, it predicts C(x)y with probability 1/2+η. Then the cardinality of A is at most s ·2c,
where s is the maximum size of a set B such that there exists a (N, b, η) QFAC for (B, C).
Proof: The c advice bits partition the set A into 2c sets As, for s ∈ {0, 1}c. Fix such a s and
consider the set As. Since s has been fixed, all x ∈ As have the same circuit Rx; only the b-qubit
quantum state Ψ(x) on which it operates depends on x. Hence there is a fixed set of measurements
such that, for a random y, the measurement My on Ψ(x) outputs C(x)y with probability 1/2 + η.
This means we have a (N, b, η) QFAC for (As, C). Hence the size of As is bounded by the maximum
size of any set for which such a code exists. This gives us the promised bound on A.
To finish the proof of Theorem 4.5, note that by Proposition 3.6, any (N, b, ε/m) QFAC for (A, C)
satisfies
log |A| ≤ b+H(δ)N + logL+O(logm/ε)
Applying Claim 5.4 to the advice circuit promised by Lemma 5.3, we deduce that the number
of strings x such that (5) holds is at most 2b+H(δ)N+log L+O(log(m/ε)) · 2m(1+ρ)+logm+t+O(1). Using
log(m) = O(logN), this expression can be upper-bounded by
2b+H(δ)N+m(1+ρ)+log L+t+O(log(1/ε)+logN)
Using the bound on m given in Theorem 4.5, we immediately get that this expression is upper-
bounded by ε2K , finishing the proof of the theorem.
Acknowledgements. We are grateful to Falk Unger and Umesh Vazirani for helpful comments
concerning the presentation of this manuscript. The first author would like to thank Luca Trevisan
for kindly sharing his understanding of extractors.
References
[ANTsV02] Andris Ambainis, Ashwin Nayak, Amnon Ta-shma, and Umesh V. Vazirani. Dense
quantum coding and quantum finite automata. Journal of the ACM, 49(4):496–511,
2002.
[BARdW08] Avraham Ben-Aroya, Oded Regev, and Ronald de Wolf. A Hypercontractive Inequality
for Matrix-Valued Functions with Applications to Quantum Computing and LDCs . In
Proceedings of the 49th IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pages
477–486, 2008. Full version at arXiv:0705.3806.
15
[CDNT98] Richard Cleve, Wim van Dam, Michael Nielsen, and Alain Tapp. Quantum entangle-
ment and the communication complexity of the inner product function. In QCQC ’98:
Selected papers from the First NASA International Conference on Quantum Computing
and Quantum Communications, pages 61–74, London, UK, 1998. Springer-Verlag.
[DM04] Stefan Dziembowski and Ueli Maurer. Optimal randomizer efficiency in the bounded-
storage model. Journal of Cryptology, 17(1):5–26, 2004.
[DPRV09] Anindya De, Christopher Portmann, Renato Renner, and Thomas Vidick. Tre-
visan’s extractor in the presence of quantum side information. Technical report
arXiv:0912.5514, 2009.
[DT09] Anindya De and Luca Trevisan. Extractors using hardness amplification.
In APPROX-RANDOM, pages 462–475, 2009. Full version available at
http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/∼anindya/exthardfull.pdf.
[FS08] Serge Fehr and Christian Schaffner. Randomness extraction via delta -biased masking
in the presence of a quantum attacker. In Ran Canetti, editor, TCC, volume 4948 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 465–481. Springer, 2008.
[GHSZ02] Venkatesan Guruswami, Johan H˚astad, Madhu Sudan, and David Zuckerman. Com-
binatorial bounds for list decoding. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory,
48(5):1021–1034, 2002.
[GKK+07] Dmitri Gavinsky, Julia Kempe, Iordanis Kerendis, Ran Raz, and Ronald de Wolf. Expo-
nential separations for one-way quantum communication complexity with applications
to cryptography. In Proceedings of the 39th ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing,
pages 516–525, 2007.
[Hol73] Alexander Holevo. Information-theoretic aspects of quantum measurement. Problems
of Information Transmission, 9(2):31–42, 1973.
[HR03] Tzvika Hartman and Ran Raz. On the distribution of the number of roots of poly-
nomials and explicit weak designs. Random Structures and Algorithms, 23(3):235–263,
2003.
[IJK06] Russell Impagliazzo, Ragesh Jaiswal, and Valentine Kabanets. Approximately List-
Decoding Direct Product Codes and Uniform Hardness Amplification. In Proceedings
of the 47th IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pages 187–196,
2006. Full version at http://www1.cs.columbia.edu/∼rjaiswal/.
[KMR05] Robert Ko¨nig, Ueli Maurer, and Renato Renner. On the power of quantum memory.
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 51(7):2391–2401, 2005.
[KT08] Robert Ko¨nig and Barbara Terhal. The bounded storage model in presence of a quan-
tum adversary. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 54(2):749–762, 2008.
[Lu04] Chi-Jen Lu. Encryption against storage-bounded adversaries from on-line strong ex-
tractors. Journal of Cryptology, 17(1):27–42, 2004.
[Mau92] Ueli M. Maurer. Conditionally-perfect secrecy and a provably-secure randomized cipher.
Journal of Cryptology, 5(1):53–66, 1992.
16
[NS06] Ashwin Nayak and Julia Salzman. Limits on the ability of quantum states to convey
classical messages. Journal of the ACM, 53(1):184–206, 2006.
[NW94] Noam Nisan and Avi Wigderson. Hardness vs randomness. Journal of Computer and
System Sciences, 49:149–167, 1994. Preliminary version in Proc. of FOCS’88.
[RRV99] R. Raz, O. Reingold, and S. Vadhan. Extracting all the randomness and reducing the
error in Trevisan’s extractors. In Proceedings of the 31st ACM Symposium on Theory
of Computing, pages 149–158, 1999.
[STV01] Madhu Sudan, Luca Trevisan, and Salil Vadhan. Pseudorandom generators without
the XOR lemma. Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 62(2):236–266, 2001.
Preliminary version in STOC-Complexity 99.
[Tre01] Luca Trevisan. Extractors and pseudorandom generators. Journal of the ACM,
48(4):860–879, 2001.
[Ts09] Amnon Ta-shma. Short seed extractors against quantum storage. In Proceedings of the
41st ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pages 401–409, 2009.
[Vad04] Salil P. Vadhan. Constructing locally computable extractors and cryptosystems in the
bounded-storage model. Journal of Cryptology, 17(1):43–77, 2004.
[Vio04] Emanuele Viola. The complexity of constructing pseudorandom generators from hard
functions. Computational Complexity, 13(3-4):147–188, 2004.
17
